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SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS
Respondent raises two new matters in her opposing brief:
first, she requests that the trial court' s decision awarding her
alimony

for

a

period

of

five

years

be

modified

and

made

permanent; second, she requests attorney fees on appeal.
Respondent
alimony because:

is

not

entitled

to

an

award

of

permanent

(1) she d i cl not file a t:i mely and pi: oper cross

appeal; and, (2) she is able to support herself at a standard of
living

to

which

she was

accustomed

during

the

marriage,

and

appellant is unable to pay alimony.
Respondent is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on
appeal because: (1) appellant's claim of error by the trial court
is based i ipon a reasonable legal and factual foundation; and, (2)
respondent has sufficient financial means with which to pay her
attorney fees in connection with this appeal.

REPLY ARGUMENTS
I.

RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF PERMANENT ALIMONY.
Respondent raises the issue in Point IV. of her brief that

the trial
to her.
court

court

erred in limiting

the duration

(Respondent's brief at 9, 24-27).

of

appeals

affirm

the trial

of alimony awarded

She requests that the

court

decision;

or in the

alternative, modify the alimony award to provide that that award
be

made

permanent.

(I£.

at

2,

27).

An award

of

permanent

alimony is not appropriate in this case on both procedural and
substantive grounds.
A. PROCEDURAL GROUNDS.
This court must decline on procedural grounds to address
respondent7 s request that the alimony award be modified because
respondent has not filed a cross appeal on this issue.
v. Kinsman, 748 P. 2d 210, 211 (Utah App. 1988);

Kinsman

Wiese v. Wiese,

699 P. 2d 700, 703 (Utah 1985).
B. SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS.
This court must decline to extend the trial court' s award
of alimony on substantive grounds for the reason that the facts
in this case do not meet the criteria established by this court
in awarding permanent alimony.
942,

951

(Utah App.

1988),

In Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P. 2d

this

court stated

that

alimony is

properly terminated where the court determines that the recipient
is able to support herself at a standard of living to which she
was accustomed during the marriage, or the obligor is unable to
pay. See als^ Bridenbauah v. Bridenbauah.
2

P. 2d

, 125 Utah

Adv

Rep

52, 5 3 (UtahApp. 1990); Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072,

1075 (Utah 1985).
In this case, respondent is capable of self-support at a
level consistent with the standard of living she enjoyed during
the marriage.

(A detailed discussion of this issue is found at

13, 18-19 and 29 of appellant's brief).

Appellant,, on the other

hand, is unable to pay alimony of any duration as a result of
the trial court' s abuse of discretion in awarding respondent over
one-half

of

premarital

a p p e J ] a n 1:" s

net

e a r n :i n g s , a J ]

o£

r e s p o n d e n t' s

assets which included income-producing property, the

overwhelming majority of the marital assets, the property
of

appellant by his father and over one-half

given

the attorney

requested by the respondent at the time of trial.

fees

(A detailed

discussion of this issue is found at 16-18, 22-24 and 2 7 - 2 8 ) .
The trial court' s allocation of the parties' financial and
material

resources

is particularly

inequitable i n this case in

that appellant is without sufficient sums with which to support
himself,

and wi11 be required

to expend

establishing his own separate household.

substantial

money

in

(See discussion at 16-

21 of appellant's brief).
The trial court' s error in this case was not in failing to
award

permanent

alimony

to

the

respondent,

but

rather,

in

awarding alimony at all.
II.

RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

Respondent requests in Point VIII. of her brief that this
court award her attorney' s fees on appeal.
3

(Respondent' s brief

at

2,

10, 39-40).

appellant' s
argument

She bases

claims

that

on

she

is

appeal
without

her claim on the argument
are

without

sufficient

merit

and

financial

that

on

means

which to pay her fees in connection with this appeal.

the
with

(Iji. at

10).
A. FRIVOLOUS APPEAL CLAIM.
In response to her first claim, this court has stated that
an

appeal

having

no

reasonable

legal

or

factual

basis

is

frivolous and may result in the imposition of costs and attorney
fees against the appellant.

Riche v. Riche.

Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 33 (Utah App. 1989).
under Rule
caution

is

P. 2d

, 123

Sanctions are permitted

3 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, but
applied

so

as

to

impose

such

sanctions

only

in

"egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right
to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. "
P. 2d

369,

369

(Utah App.

1988).

Porco v. Porco, 752

Accordingly,

sanctions

are

imposed only when:
[A]n appeal is obviously without any merit
and has been taken with no reasonable
likelihood of prevailing, and results in
delayed implementation of the judgment of the
lower court; increased costs in litigation;
and dissipation of the time and resources of
the Law Court.
Id. (Citations omitted).
The thrust of respondent' s arguments against the appellant
in support of her claim for attorney fees under rule 33 are that:
(1)

the

respondent

successfully

proved

at

trial

that

appellant testified falsely (Respondent's brief at 8, 14-17);
4

the

(2) the trial court may elect not to impose interest on the
judgment (Respondent's brief at 10, 31-32); (3) the evidence and
application

of the law supports

only an interpretation that

gifts made by appellant' s father were intended for the benefit of
both parties and should be awarded to respondent (Respondent' s
brief at 9-10, 27-31); and, (4) the evidence presented met all
elements necessary to sustain an award of attorney fees by the
trial court (Respondent's brief at 10, 32- 39).
Regrettably,

respondent

also includes

as part of her

argument numerous ad hominem remarks (Respondent' s brief at 2-3,
13, 41), as well as matters not admitted into evidence before the
trial court, which must not be considered on appeal to this court
(Respondent's brief at 21-23; Vol. I. Transcript of proceedings
at ii.; Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P. 2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App. 1987)).
Responding

to

each

argument

made by the respondent,

appellant first addresses the issue of credibility.

The findings

of fact, which were drafted by the respondent, are instructive on
this issue.

Paragraph six of the findings concludes, in part,

that either appellant was underpaid or overpaid by his employer.
Paragraph

seven

of the

findings

concludes,

in part,

that

conflicting testimony was presented about the accuracy of the
parties'

tax returns

(which respondent admitted

(Vol. I. Transcript of proceedings at 302)).

she prepared

Paragraph fifteen

concludes, in part, that the court believed that appellant was
paid not more than $ 2, 000. 00 during the time that appellant' s
father gifted certain sums of money.
5

Finally, paragraph eighteen

refers the reader to the judge's ruling from the bench, who, from
page 347 through 349, points the finger of disbelief at both
parties.
The second argument raised by respondent concerning the
trial

court' s discretion to modify or abate interest on the

judgment may be disposed summarily on the basis of this court' s
decision in Marchant v. Marchant. 743 P. 2d 199, 206-07 (Utah App.
1987).

Inasmuch as this issue alone justifies an appeal from

the decision of the trial court, respondent is not entitled to
attorney fees under rule 3 3.
The third

argument

raised

by respondent

concerns the

trial court' s assessment of the evidence and its application of
law -to the distribution of marital assets acquired by gifted
money from appellant' s father.

Assuming for argument purposes

that respondent' s position is correct; that is, that the trial
court properly concluded that the money gifted by appellant' s
father was given to both parties and that the Mortensen decision
does not apply to this case, this court on appeal must still
address the issues raised by appellant in Point I. of his brief,
that is, that the trial court inequitably divided the income and
property of the parties, leaving appellant without sufficient
means to support himself.

(See appellant's brief at 10-21).

The trial court' s division of marital assets, debts and
income

leaves

respondent

with

compared to appellant's $ 442.00.

$

1,680.00 per
(IJ3*

at 17).

month

income

In addition,

respondent was awarded the marital home; the rental home; all of
6

the household

furniture,

fixtures

and appliances; the family

vehicle; and, approximately $ 4,000.00 in attorney fees.
Respondent's brief at 7).

(Id. :

Appellant received one-half of the

equity in the marital home without interest, a boat, a vehicle
owned by his employer and certain items of personal property.
(Respondent's brief at 7; Findings of Fact, paragraph 14).

On

the face of the findings, this court can determine that the
distribution was inequitable.
The offsetting factor for the

trial court' s lopsided award

is presumably the trial court' s belief that appellant had more
income than reflected in the parties' tax returns,

(Vol. II.

Transcript of proceedings at 349; Respondent's brief at 21-24),
even though the trial court was unable to determine what amount
that might be. (L&, 349-50).

The problem with this analysis is

that whether appellant earned a nominal or substantial amount
more than the evidence depicted is not known.

There is no

baseline from which this court may determine the fairness of the
trial court' s division now, or in the future should either party
come before this court on a modification of the decree.
The fourth argument raised by the respondent concerns the
sufficiency of the evidence to determine the reasonableness and
need for attorney fees requested by the respondent at the time of
trial.

The element of reasonableness is addressed in detail in

pages 24-27 of appellant' s brief and will not be repeated here.
There is, however, an aspect of the need for attorney fees which
has not been addressed in respondent' s brief.
7

The evidence and

argument discussed at pages 36-37 of respondent' s brief does not
address

the

fact

that

respondent

has

been

awarded

a

disproportionate share of the parties' income and property and is
in better financial position than the appellant to pay her costs
and attorney fees incurred at trial.
Appellant

has

asserted

reasonable

legal

and

factual

arguments in support of his claim that the trial court erred.

If

there are numerous arguments in his claim, it is for the reason
and fact that the trial court made numerous errors.

Appellant' s

claim has merit and therefore respondent is not entitled to an
award of attorney fees under rule 3 3.
B. INSUFFICIENT MEANS CLAIM.
The final argument made by respondent in support of her
claim

for attorney

sufficient

means

fees

with

on appeal
which

to

is

pay

that
her

she
fees

is

without

on appeal.

Respondent has the option of reducing the rental property awarded
to her to cash, if she so chooses, or of mortgaging either home
awarded to her.

Instead, she requests that appellant pay her

fees on appeal.

The unfairness of her approach is demonstrated

in the final paragraph on page 40 of her brief.

Respondent asks

this court that she not be required to expend her assets to pay
her attorney, and that the court require appellant to come up
with the funds, but does not refer this court to a source from
which appellant can draw to pay her obligation.

8

CONCLUSION
This court must reappraise the decision of the trial court
in this case because the allocation of the parties' financial and
material possessions is so discordant that appellant is unable to
pursue his separate life.
relief

Appellant' s appeal to this court for

from the trial' s court erroneous

decision should not

result in sanctions against him or in an award of permanent
alimony in favor of the respondent on an issue which has not been
brought properly before this court.
DATED this )$fr day of February, 1990.

^77. Or,-, A,,J~J
DAVID /&.

SSOLOWIT Z/

M. JOY DOUGLAS
Attorneys for appellant
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Mr. Kent M. Kasting, Esq.
DART, ADAMSON AND KASTING
Attorney for respondent
310 South Main Street
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